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Sunday, September 18, 2022
Sunday, July 24, 2022
Pandemics & Asteroids
Pandemics & Asteroids
A new way of thinking and talking about pandemics and asteroids -- low risk but high consequence events. Please read and subscribe for free to my platform at the link! Enjoy your free subscription!
Monday, May 30, 2022
Native America's Chidren
If you are interested in a new topic, here is today's article in Unintended Consequences:
Wednesday, May 25, 2022
Unintended Consequences ahead
Hi to all of my readers from around the world,
If you have enjoyed reading my blogpost for the past eight years (yes eight years!) I would like to invite you to read my first article on complex societal issues and the public policy solutions that create unintended consequences. I will be writing regularly on this platform called substack.
I will continue to write here on bioterrorism and pandemics policy and law.
Here is the link to my first article, and I hope you will subscribe:
https://profvictoria.substack.com/p/the-loss-of-occupations-and-identity?sd=fs
Victoria Sutton
Tuesday, August 31, 2021
African Swine Fever -the U.S. swine industry is at risk for the first time in 40 years
One of the unique qualities of African Swine Fever is its amazing ability to travel in the wind. Castro claimed the U.S. had tried to use ASF in a biological attack, but the proclivity of ASF to travel as much as 200 miles via the wind, made many other sources likely. The U.S. was not found to have used ASF, but it is still on the list for a potential agri-bioweapon, but even without human intervention Mother Nature can decimate a swine industry.
China, where ASF is endemic, has had repeated outbreaks of African Swine Fever over the last five years, and it has popped up in Eastern Europe from time to time, recently.
An occurrence of ASF requires immediate destruction of the herd to eliminate the highly contagious spread to other farms.
Now, it has been reported that African Swine Fever has been detected in the Caribbean, the first identification in the Western Hemisphere in about 40 years, according to Agri-Pulse.
ASF was detected in the Dominican Republic and then spread to other farms. Haiti, part of the same island, is the nearest nation at risk from this occurrence.
The OIE is the international organization responsible for animal health and reporting outbreaks, and the Dominican Republic is to be commended for promptly reporting the first outbreak on July 29, 2021. Prompt reporting will ensure international resources to assist these nations and it also complies with international law. We have come to appreciate prompt reporting of outbreaks after the COVID-19 pandemic, still raging in its first significant variant phase, throughout the world, after witnessing what failure to promptly report can do to the world.
Given that the Dominican Republic is 700 miles from the U.S., it is in our interest to immediately assist the Caribbean nation and protect Haiti swine from the disease as much and as quickly as possible.
According to Agri-Pulse, China has lost more than a million pigs over the past five years. A University of Iowa study estimated that the U.S. would lose $40 billion over ten years if ASF appeared in the U.S..
The USDA has offered assistance to the Dominican Republic and Haiti, confirmed in a press release from the Department. The USDA is a robust federal government Department with unmatched expertise in animal diseases. They have the capability and capacity to assist the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and for many years they have all been in cooperation with surveillance programs.
Let's hope the Caribbean nations are open to assistance.
Friday, February 12, 2021
Cyberbioattack on a Florida Water Supply -- No one should be surprised
It was only a matter of time until a cyberbiohacker emerged. Last week, a cyberbiohacker hacked into the operating system for a Florida municipal water utility, and got control of the chemical control code and tried to increase the sodium hydroxide from 100 to 11,100 parts per million. Sodium hydroxide is "lye" and can cause injury or death if consumed.
A similar attack on infrastructure took place in Rye, New York, where hackers hacked into the control system of a dam and successfully managed to control the opening and closing of the gates -- had the gates not been in repair and inoperable, the flooding from opening the gates would have been life-threatening to the cities downstream. The perpetrators in that scheme turned out to be Iranian hackers, and they are on the Interpol red list, but unlikely that they will be leaving Iran. At the time, it was apparent that hacking into water systems and potentially poisoning the water was not only conceivable but likely. No one should be surprised with this attack.
The FBI might want to start with that team of cyberhackers with similar motives.
What is shockingly obvious is that we have let federalism get in the way of helping municipalities protect their water supply. Although local and state governments have jurisdiction to control their supplies, the federal government has long had jurisdiction over water quality through the Safe Drinking Water Act, and waste water treatment through the Clean Water Act. In fact, after 9/11, the Safe Drinking Water Act was amended to require security systems and fences installed around water systems to prevent terrorist attacks.
Now that fences no longer protect water systems, it is time for Congress to focus on the urgent problems facing America, and protecting the water supply should be a top priority.
Some water systems add some to prevent corrosion in the pipes.
Friday, June 5, 2020
Certificates of Immunity in America?
Adm.
Giroir, the COVID-19 testing czar,[1] has stated that “tens of millions”[2] of antibody tests would be
in the pipeline, soon; but they come with many uncertainties about what that
will mean. There is no clear evidence that having antibodies to COVID-19 will
protect you from getting the disease again, and to the extent we can believe
it, reports from China were that people were being reinfected after recovering
from the viral infection.[3] There are several strains
of COVID-19 that could complicate the antibody tests, and the level of
antibodies necessary to confer immunity is another measure we do not have.[4] We are relying on decades
of studies and the very scientific underpinning for vaccines that tell us that
antibodies from a COVID-19 infection should make us immune to COVID-19. Even
that basic medical principle is challenged by COVID-19.
The
concept of “herd immunity” is at least part of the recovery plan for Sweden,
where they believe more than 30% of the population has antibodies to COVID-19,[5] creating an antibody
environment that would slow transmission. But some experts believe it takes
closer to 60% of the population with immunity to achieve the herd immunity
effect.[6] We, in the U.S., are far
from this standard, today.
So
assuming we answer these scientific questions, and certificates of immunity, an
idea discussed in April by the U.S. public health leadership are considered?[7] What are the legal issues?
The
first reaction to certificates of immunity has been to reference the idea as a dystopian
plot for a novel. Labeling and stigmatization of individuals is the fear. The
second, and far more damaging reference, was to use the term “suspend
individual rights” in order to reopen America. We do not, let me repeat, we do
not, suspend individual rights, ever, under our Constitution. For those of you
who are planning on government collapse, you may be disappointed because we
have a well-practiced, continuity of government (COG) plan in place (and now
ready) should government be even slightly diminished in function.
We
also have a prohibition against military governance, the Posse Comitatus Act, passed after reconstruction following the U.S.
Civil War, because we saw it was a very bad idea to have a military-civilian
law enforcement relationship. So any “suspension” of individual rights is
clearly prohibited by law.
The
U.S. Constitution is still our guaranteed protection against tyranny. The Bill
of Rights ensures, without suspension, how those rights are balanced against
the interests of the American society and its protection against invasion from outside
the nation and crime, public health and property protection, from inside the
country.
So
how do we balance the need to reopen the economy and allow individuals to
pursue work and life? A certificate of immunity is one idea to safely govern
the return to work, school and play, but it must not burden individual rights
and protections more than it benefits and serves the needs of the American
people – in Constitutional law language, it is the compelling government
interest in reopening the economy and protecting public health that must
outweigh the burden on individual rights. The balance is making sure it is
worth the burden placed on individual protection and rights.
Now
let us examine the individual rights that would be “burdened” by a certificate
of immunity, again, assuming we find a reliable diagnostic test on which to base
such a certification.
First,
the U.S. Supreme Court has opined that the U.S. Constitution guarantees the
right of privacy. This is found not in the word “privacy” anywhere in the text
of the Constitution, but collectively found from the 3rd, 4th,
5th, 10th and 15th Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution. That is settled law. That means your health information is a
privacy interest of every individual, and Congress has ensured it is protected
through the HIPAA protection that is afforded patients of healthcare providers.
However, HIPAA does provide for the revealing of that information to public
health authorities in a public health emergency, which is considered a burden
that is not too great on individual privacy rights, in that narrow circumstance
of a public health emergency. As of this writing, there is a declared national
public health emergency and all fifty states have issued public health
emergency proclamations or the equivalent. Your privacy right would weigh less
in the balance of these set of facts and circumstances.
Second,
equal rights for every individual is guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment, and discrimination against an immutable characteristic is prohibited
– meaning something you cannot change, like gender, race, etc. Immunity is not
an immutable characteristic and can even be changed with a vaccination. That
said, individuals with immuno-compromised conditions and other risk factors
that would make attempts at gaining immunity from the disease or a vaccination
prohibitive, warrant special consideration. Part of a certificate of immunity
policy would have to plan for how this class of individuals might return to
work without discrimination based on these characteristics that they cannot
change.
Third,
workplace discrimination is prohibited by genetic information, and there is
some indication that genetic information could be correlated with immunity for
a more reliable immunity determination. Workplace discrimination based on
genetics is prohibited by federal law,[8] the Genetic Information and
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008.[9] Congress would have to
adopt an amendment to GINA to allow the use of genetic information as part of a
certificate of immunity. However, workplace discrimination has been held to be
likely enough for a federal district court to issue an injunction against a
hospital where a group of nurses refused a smallpox vaccination as a condition
of continuing in their jobs in the hospital in Washington State.[10] This was a federal
district court order, but it is an indication of how the law might be applied, if
tested, in other courts, with certificates of immunity as a condition to return
to work. Remember, this is also a balancing test, and this conflict occurred
almost one year after the passage of the Smallpox Protection Act in response to
the threat posed by the anthrax attacks of 2001. That law called for taking the
precautionary step of vaccinating frontline workers with the smallpox vaccine. In
2003, the threat was still very real, but by 2004, the threat had largely
passed in terms of public perception and the balancing of the risk of the
smallpox vaccine against the likelihood of a smallpox attack (the compelling
government interest being to protect the nation) no longer seemed balanced. For
now, the balance of a certificate of immunity for COVID-19 weighed against the
need to safely return the American workforce to work may be a much more
acceptable balance. As circumstances and conditions change with regard to
COVID-19, so too, would the balancing test.
Fourth,
safety in the workplace where personal protective equipment is required by the
employer, as a condition of employment, can be bolstered by the employer relying
on state and federal recommendations and protocols.
Finally,
how different is a certificate of immunity from a vaccination record that is required
to attend public school and public universities? Requiring vaccinations for
public school has been found to be consistent with our Constitution[11] where exceptions can be
made for those unable to have vaccinations. This policy is driven by the susceptibility
of children to these childhood diseases balanced by its narrow application to
public school attendance and the compelling government interest of preserving
the lives of many more children by using vaccinations.
The
unintended consequences of such a policy must also be considered. Such a policy
might drive those who vitally need to return to work to sustain themselves and
their families to infect themselves to obtain immunity,[12] perhaps with deadly
consequences. In fact, just the mention of certificates of immunity may have
triggered some individuals to get a “head start” on the policy. (We already
have a network of “chicken pox parties” in Facebook groups who plan intentional
infections of the childhood disease for their children with the dangerous and
perverse logic that it will help them.[13] It is not an unreasonable
assumption that the same network might be developed for COVID-19.)
Will
such a policy create a stigmatized group of individuals? Not if we plan
accommodations in the policy for those who are unable to obtain immunity and
thus the certificates of immunity. Even without certificates of immunity, there
are already classes of individuals that should not return to work where the
risk of infection is high, like the risk group of 65 and older. There may be
stigmatization against young adults who are largely identified as the
population that can spread the disease with no symptoms, potentially making
them a stigmatized group.
The
balance of the government interest against the burden on individuals having to
prove such immunity with certificates to return to work, school and play could very
well be constitutionally balanced, now, in these times and circumstances. It
does not mean this will always be the balance, because when the threat
subsides, and the burden becomes unwarranted by the compelling government
interest to keep us safe from COVID-19, certificates of immunity will no longer
be warranted.
Finally,
despite the increasing use of Executive Orders when Congress will not act to
carry out the policies of a duly elected President (exercised by Presidents of
both political parties), certificates of immunity would be considered a
“rulemaking” meaning that it would have a legal impact on individuals. At a
minimum, such a policy would require an authorizing statute giving broad
authority to make such a rule, but it would also require notice and comment for
60 days, which could be repeated until the rule/law is final. In an emergency,
the certificates of immunity could be instituted, while a rulemaking is
underway. Rather than the Executive Branch risking a judicial review of the
legality of a certificate of immunity requirement, a certificate of immunity
could be made voluntary for employees
and employers, but that would leave employers who demand the certificates as an
absolute condition of employment exposed to litigation without the authority of
a federal requirement as a per se defense.
Certificates
of immunity would create two general groups: those who can work, study and play
and those who still have access to these activities in a more protected way. If
we do not have certificates of immunity, the likelihood of stigmatizing groups
known to be vulnerable (older adults), and groups known to be spreaders without
symptoms (younger adults) is a certainty, which will raise Constitutional
issues to resolve.
So,
if science can give us a reliable test with predictability, a certificate of
immunity can be managed with no suspension of the Constitution or
individual rights. The Constitution will operate the way it was designed, with
principles of freedom, democracy and dignity and protected rights for the
individual.
[9] Pub.L.
110–233, 122 Stat. 881 (May 21, 2008).
[10] Washington
State Nurses Assoc. v. Virginia Mason Medical Center, (W.D. Wash., Oct 1, 2004).
[11] Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
also citing several state cases that upheld the authority to require school
vaccinations.
Saturday, April 25, 2020
China's contempt for compliance with international law calls for rethinking public health diplomacy
The International Health Regulations have been around since the 1960s and agreed to by the World Health Assembly, binding all members of the World Health Organization. But the IHR of 1969 was weak, at best, in terms of obligations on members. There were only four reportable diseases, one being smallpox which dropped off the list in the late 1970s and the remaining diseases, Yellow Fever, Cholera and Plague were not frequent epidemics and all of them had treatment protocols that would contain any outbreak.
The SARS pandemic, often called the first pandemic of the millenia, started in Guangdong, China in November 2002, and was kept quiet by the Chinese government. But in February 2003, a doctor brought the virus to Hong Kong, and began the worldwide spread that resulted in more than 8,000 infections and 800 deaths in 26 countries before it was contained or just disappeared as it evolved. The World Health Organization had only the IHR of 1969 and no obligation for China to report a novel coronavirus, only one of the three reportable diseases. While it had been clear for some time that the IHR of 1969 needed to be updated, the shameful failure of China to report the outbreak and allow it to spread beyond its borders before allowing help to arrive in identifying the virus, pushed the revision of IHR to the top of the WHO Agenda.
So immediately after the spread from China to Hong Kong, and the refusal of China to cooperate with outside scientists, the World Health Organization assembly of members, the World Health Assembly, passed a resolution, WHA 56.29, May 28, 2003, that urged WHO member states to take eleven specific actions to enhance, support, and strengthen national, regional, and international efforts to address the SARS outbreak. But most significantly, they also passed resolution WHA 56.28, to begin revision of the IHR, urging member states to give “high priority” to revising the IHRs 1969 and “to provide the resources and cooperation necessary to facilitate the progress of such work.”
Most importantly, WHA56.28 granted the WHO power to intervene by sending WHO teams to independently investigate and conduct “on-the-spot studies” to determine whether national authorities are taking “appropriate control measures.”
The Washington Post reported that the actions by the World Health Assembly “mark the first significant expansion of WHO power in more than three decades.” They wrote that WHA56.28 “frees [the] WHO from having to wait until a country officially reports an international health threat before beginning countermeasures . . . and gives the agency the authority to begin ground inspections without a formal invitation.” [Rob Stein, WHO Gets Wider Power to Fight Global Health Threats, Wash Post A15 (May 28, 2003)]. Everyone knew why WHO was granted to the power to enter a country without invitation, and it was clear that China had paved the way for such a sovereignty-infringing regulation and making it acceptable to WHO Members.
China was silent, while WHO tried diplomacy to gain access for scientists to diagnose the disease. After gaining access to enter China around March, by April WHO was threatening to leave and withdraw resources because of lack of cooperation by China.
Meanwhile, the revision of the IHR was underway and a final draft was signed by the Members of WHO in 2005 and the regulations became effective (and binding) June 2007. China was a signatory, and they agreed to be bound by the new regulations that required reporting within 24 hours of confirming a disease with certain charateristics that would add up to threating global public health, identifed as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).
Now, twelve years after the IHR went into effect, in 2019, another coronavirus emerges within China's borders; and again, China sat silent, even punishing those who would dare to speak out about the novel deadly coronavirus. But the IHR anticipated this type of secrecy and so it also provided for reports to come from reporters or individuals directly to WHO, alerting WHO of a disease coverup. The country is notified for a response. This is the legal mechanism that allowed WHO to pursue the COVID-19 reports followed by the obligatory response of China based on individual reports leaked from the country. So China failed to comply with its simpliest requirement to send a notification to the WHO within 24 hours of determining they had a disease that met the definition of a PHEIC. Years of diplomacy to ensure the problem child of the international public health community, China, would comply with regulations so clearly triggered by China's failures during SARS.
So the difference between SARS and COVID-19 for China is clear. For SARS, China was just a morally and ethically bad global citizen. For COVID-19, China violated international law by all accounts and should be accountable in an appropriate judicial or diplomatic forum. Ideally, the IHR violations should trigger the WHO or even the UN Security Council to sanction China for violating international norms and regulations.
What does this say for the value of international law if China is given a pass by the WHO for this history of violating international norms and rules? It makes all international law, weaker.
Maybe WHO as an international diplomatic mechanism is something that is time to rethink, and maybe withholding dues to an organization that has done nothing to enforce its IHRs is not so unreasonable.
The SARS pandemic, often called the first pandemic of the millenia, started in Guangdong, China in November 2002, and was kept quiet by the Chinese government. But in February 2003, a doctor brought the virus to Hong Kong, and began the worldwide spread that resulted in more than 8,000 infections and 800 deaths in 26 countries before it was contained or just disappeared as it evolved. The World Health Organization had only the IHR of 1969 and no obligation for China to report a novel coronavirus, only one of the three reportable diseases. While it had been clear for some time that the IHR of 1969 needed to be updated, the shameful failure of China to report the outbreak and allow it to spread beyond its borders before allowing help to arrive in identifying the virus, pushed the revision of IHR to the top of the WHO Agenda.
So immediately after the spread from China to Hong Kong, and the refusal of China to cooperate with outside scientists, the World Health Organization assembly of members, the World Health Assembly, passed a resolution, WHA 56.29, May 28, 2003, that urged WHO member states to take eleven specific actions to enhance, support, and strengthen national, regional, and international efforts to address the SARS outbreak. But most significantly, they also passed resolution WHA 56.28, to begin revision of the IHR, urging member states to give “high priority” to revising the IHRs 1969 and “to provide the resources and cooperation necessary to facilitate the progress of such work.”
Most importantly, WHA56.28 granted the WHO power to intervene by sending WHO teams to independently investigate and conduct “on-the-spot studies” to determine whether national authorities are taking “appropriate control measures.”
The Washington Post reported that the actions by the World Health Assembly “mark the first significant expansion of WHO power in more than three decades.” They wrote that WHA56.28 “frees [the] WHO from having to wait until a country officially reports an international health threat before beginning countermeasures . . . and gives the agency the authority to begin ground inspections without a formal invitation.” [Rob Stein, WHO Gets Wider Power to Fight Global Health Threats, Wash Post A15 (May 28, 2003)]. Everyone knew why WHO was granted to the power to enter a country without invitation, and it was clear that China had paved the way for such a sovereignty-infringing regulation and making it acceptable to WHO Members.
China was silent, while WHO tried diplomacy to gain access for scientists to diagnose the disease. After gaining access to enter China around March, by April WHO was threatening to leave and withdraw resources because of lack of cooperation by China.
Meanwhile, the revision of the IHR was underway and a final draft was signed by the Members of WHO in 2005 and the regulations became effective (and binding) June 2007. China was a signatory, and they agreed to be bound by the new regulations that required reporting within 24 hours of confirming a disease with certain charateristics that would add up to threating global public health, identifed as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).
Now, twelve years after the IHR went into effect, in 2019, another coronavirus emerges within China's borders; and again, China sat silent, even punishing those who would dare to speak out about the novel deadly coronavirus. But the IHR anticipated this type of secrecy and so it also provided for reports to come from reporters or individuals directly to WHO, alerting WHO of a disease coverup. The country is notified for a response. This is the legal mechanism that allowed WHO to pursue the COVID-19 reports followed by the obligatory response of China based on individual reports leaked from the country. So China failed to comply with its simpliest requirement to send a notification to the WHO within 24 hours of determining they had a disease that met the definition of a PHEIC. Years of diplomacy to ensure the problem child of the international public health community, China, would comply with regulations so clearly triggered by China's failures during SARS.
So the difference between SARS and COVID-19 for China is clear. For SARS, China was just a morally and ethically bad global citizen. For COVID-19, China violated international law by all accounts and should be accountable in an appropriate judicial or diplomatic forum. Ideally, the IHR violations should trigger the WHO or even the UN Security Council to sanction China for violating international norms and regulations.
What does this say for the value of international law if China is given a pass by the WHO for this history of violating international norms and rules? It makes all international law, weaker.
Maybe WHO as an international diplomatic mechanism is something that is time to rethink, and maybe withholding dues to an organization that has done nothing to enforce its IHRs is not so unreasonable.
Saturday, April 11, 2020
Has anything really changed with our way of coping with pandemics in human history?
An excerpt from an 11-year old's journal in 1912 about a smallpox epidemic in her town and how it affects her family was published by a relative in the Coeur d'Allene newspaper today, and the observation that I have to make is that we are dealing with COVID-19 about like we did with smallpox in 1912, without a lot of advancement. Quarantine and isolation is in use, but with slightly less constitutional due process, and family social-distancing is practiced. The same family factors are still important --the father is missing work, and the extended family is buying groceries and leaving them on the doorstep for the sick family.
Let's not stop with the analogy, and continue to travel back in time.
The year is 1350, and the black plague is in full force in Europe. Without any knowledge of germ theory, social distancing is still practiced and is the rule of the day. Some towns are completely quarantined and no one enters or leaves. Some houses are boarded shut -- with the residents inside, who were destined to pass on from the plague. The religious leaders said the pandemic was punishment from God, and flagellating zealots wandered from town to town in hopes of redeeming society, and bringing a close to the largest wave of death ever seen by Europe (in recorded history). Doctors and everyone who could afford a mask, wore one. By the time the plague arrived again in the 1400s, King HenryVI banned kissing in England; and in the 1600s, the iconic doctor's mask with a large beak, made of leather and stuffed with fragrant flowers, was the standard of personal protective equipment.
Nothing much has changed. We seem to be coping with the pandemic much the same way we did with the same tools since the 1300s, with incremental improvements from century to century. Quarantine and isolation are still are best tools to fight COVID-19; masks and "face coverings" are the standard of personal protective equipment for leaving your home, if you can; and some religious leaders are suggesting the world is being punished for its sins. I am not disputing the truth of that, I am simply saying we are still saying the same things and doing the same things in response to a pandemic, as we did since the beginning of recorded history, despite the industrial revolution, the physics revolution and now the biotechnology revolution.
So what, if anything, has changed?
Hope that we can cure it -- a realistic hope. As a society we are not panicked because we know that in infectious diseases of the past, we have followed a process of researching and using vaccines to combat viral infectious diseases, including childhood diseases, and yes, that scourge of smallpox. We also have the benefit of centuries of data on the epidemiological curves (a mid-19th century discovery) and have some imperfect projection of how we will reach a peak, how high the peak might be, and when we can expect to see changes to the infection and death rate. Yes, it is imperfect, but it gives us an edge on predictability, that we didn't have in 1352, or even 1912. There was such a complete lack of hope during the Black Plague, and many thought the end of the world was coming, that there was wild drunkenness and orgies in defiance of the expected coming end of the world.
One other notable similarity -- our counts of deaths during the Black Plague in Europe are fairly accurate; yet, we have no accurate information about the true number of deaths in Asia from the Black Plague. Some things never change.
The compliance and calm has been strikingly successful, leaving us with the final observation that we have a realistic hope for a way to win in this war against COVID-19, in a way, our human predecessors did not. We are also able to adapt to our isolation through the humanity-changing technology, with our worldwide interconnection through the internet. Many (not all) are able to continue working online, ordering food online, and learning online. We are incrementally less disrupted, by these incredible changes to the way that humans connect.
Will this change us when COVID-19 subsides? If the changes after 9/11 and the anthrax attacks are any indication, we will be changed by this forever, in some major ways and some subtle ways. Will we move farther into cyberspace to connect, and thereby be less disrupted by the next pandemic?
Almost certainly.
Let's not stop with the analogy, and continue to travel back in time.
The year is 1350, and the black plague is in full force in Europe. Without any knowledge of germ theory, social distancing is still practiced and is the rule of the day. Some towns are completely quarantined and no one enters or leaves. Some houses are boarded shut -- with the residents inside, who were destined to pass on from the plague. The religious leaders said the pandemic was punishment from God, and flagellating zealots wandered from town to town in hopes of redeeming society, and bringing a close to the largest wave of death ever seen by Europe (in recorded history). Doctors and everyone who could afford a mask, wore one. By the time the plague arrived again in the 1400s, King HenryVI banned kissing in England; and in the 1600s, the iconic doctor's mask with a large beak, made of leather and stuffed with fragrant flowers, was the standard of personal protective equipment.
Nothing much has changed. We seem to be coping with the pandemic much the same way we did with the same tools since the 1300s, with incremental improvements from century to century. Quarantine and isolation are still are best tools to fight COVID-19; masks and "face coverings" are the standard of personal protective equipment for leaving your home, if you can; and some religious leaders are suggesting the world is being punished for its sins. I am not disputing the truth of that, I am simply saying we are still saying the same things and doing the same things in response to a pandemic, as we did since the beginning of recorded history, despite the industrial revolution, the physics revolution and now the biotechnology revolution.
So what, if anything, has changed?
Hope that we can cure it -- a realistic hope. As a society we are not panicked because we know that in infectious diseases of the past, we have followed a process of researching and using vaccines to combat viral infectious diseases, including childhood diseases, and yes, that scourge of smallpox. We also have the benefit of centuries of data on the epidemiological curves (a mid-19th century discovery) and have some imperfect projection of how we will reach a peak, how high the peak might be, and when we can expect to see changes to the infection and death rate. Yes, it is imperfect, but it gives us an edge on predictability, that we didn't have in 1352, or even 1912. There was such a complete lack of hope during the Black Plague, and many thought the end of the world was coming, that there was wild drunkenness and orgies in defiance of the expected coming end of the world.
One other notable similarity -- our counts of deaths during the Black Plague in Europe are fairly accurate; yet, we have no accurate information about the true number of deaths in Asia from the Black Plague. Some things never change.
The compliance and calm has been strikingly successful, leaving us with the final observation that we have a realistic hope for a way to win in this war against COVID-19, in a way, our human predecessors did not. We are also able to adapt to our isolation through the humanity-changing technology, with our worldwide interconnection through the internet. Many (not all) are able to continue working online, ordering food online, and learning online. We are incrementally less disrupted, by these incredible changes to the way that humans connect.
Will this change us when COVID-19 subsides? If the changes after 9/11 and the anthrax attacks are any indication, we will be changed by this forever, in some major ways and some subtle ways. Will we move farther into cyberspace to connect, and thereby be less disrupted by the next pandemic?
Almost certainly.
Wednesday, April 1, 2020
Ethics of Selecting who gets a ventilator
This is not a shocking new idea, although it is the next step that we will have to take while we simultaneously try to flatten the curve of the infections.
The predicted shortage of ventilators has raised the question of how hospitals will select who gets a ventilator, and essentially, who lives and who dies?
Some considerations for ventilator distribution is first, to what cities should the stockpiles be sent? Should this be on a per capita basis, or on the actual, not predicted, cases? Now that directives on how to use a ventilator on two people have been discussed, that should be the first consideration before making any choices. Looking to the ethical guidance issued during the vaccine shortage of 2003-4, reveals some of the key considerations for similar respiratory distress risk groups.
During the bird flu outbreak the flu vaccine was in short supply because the U.S. supply had been sourced from a vaccine facility in France that had a contamination incident, and no shipment could be made to the U.S.. The second reason was a shortage of eggs that are used to make vaccine. Bird flu meant a lot of birds were destroyed creating an egg shortage, as well as a concern of contaminated eggs.
The New York Times reported on October 7, 2004, that the U.S. will receive only about 55 of the 110 million doses of flu vaccine ordered.
This led the CDC to convene its Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices (ACIP) to determine who would get the flu vaccine, since not everyone would have access to it.
Many were critical at the time that front-line medical workers should have been at the top of the list rather than at the bottom. CDC was planning to revisit the hierarchy and mercifully, the flu season ended without being as bad as expected. In 2005, CDC made recommendations again, and healthcare workers were near the top of the list.
Since 1990, flu vaccinations in the U.S. nearly tripled in the 1990s, making the 2004 shortage a real issue (see graphic).
When the ACIP or ethics board gathers to consider who gets a ventilator, let's hope that healthcare workers are at or near the top, because the preservation of life (without question) is directly dependent on healthcare workers.
The predicted shortage of ventilators has raised the question of how hospitals will select who gets a ventilator, and essentially, who lives and who dies?
Some considerations for ventilator distribution is first, to what cities should the stockpiles be sent? Should this be on a per capita basis, or on the actual, not predicted, cases? Now that directives on how to use a ventilator on two people have been discussed, that should be the first consideration before making any choices. Looking to the ethical guidance issued during the vaccine shortage of 2003-4, reveals some of the key considerations for similar respiratory distress risk groups.
During the bird flu outbreak the flu vaccine was in short supply because the U.S. supply had been sourced from a vaccine facility in France that had a contamination incident, and no shipment could be made to the U.S.. The second reason was a shortage of eggs that are used to make vaccine. Bird flu meant a lot of birds were destroyed creating an egg shortage, as well as a concern of contaminated eggs.
The New York Times reported on October 7, 2004, that the U.S. will receive only about 55 of the 110 million doses of flu vaccine ordered.
This led the CDC to convene its Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices (ACIP) to determine who would get the flu vaccine, since not everyone would have access to it.
Although CDC wrote that each group had the same priority, the listing had the effect of suggesting a priority in this order:
1. infants
2. elderly
3. chronically-ill
4. front-line
medical workers
Many were critical at the time that front-line medical workers should have been at the top of the list rather than at the bottom. CDC was planning to revisit the hierarchy and mercifully, the flu season ended without being as bad as expected. In 2005, CDC made recommendations again, and healthcare workers were near the top of the list.
Since 1990, flu vaccinations in the U.S. nearly tripled in the 1990s, making the 2004 shortage a real issue (see graphic).
When the ACIP or ethics board gathers to consider who gets a ventilator, let's hope that healthcare workers are at or near the top, because the preservation of life (without question) is directly dependent on healthcare workers.
Thursday, March 19, 2020
The Trajectory of COVID-19 cases in Select Countries
The trajectory of COVID-19 shows a very different rate of reported new cases.
The analysis of public health measures will continue to unfold as the escalation of cases continues. But there is hope with the Italy trajectory. Yesterday, there was a drop in cases, that we hope indicates the end of the second peak that is typical in a highly infectious event. There may even be a third peak, but predictably lower.
The trajectory for Italy is strikingly more steep than for South Korea. Some epidemiologists are offering the analysis that there are more elderly people Italy (23% over 65 yrs) than in South Korea (13% over 65 yrs) as the primary reason for the difference.
I would like to suggest it was more related to the policy decisions made to stop the spread of the virus, which included immediate isolation and quarantine as well as some methods that would be unacceptable in the U.S. or Europe, such as contact tracing through cellphone records. The government had data about every contact each individual with a cell phone had, enabling the government of South Korea to reach those contacts of infected individuals immediately to contain the spread by isolating or quarantining those that had come in contact with the infected individual. In contrast, according to CGTN (China Global Television Network) the "Mayor of Florence Dario Nardella has suggested residents hug Chinese people to encourage them in the fight against the novel coronavirus." That was good in spirit, but resulted in a lot more than hugging one individual, where several people would embrace each other at once -- not recommended public health practice. By having groups of 3-4 people hugging each other, it was the opposite of WHO recommendations to practice social distancing.
The analysis of public health measures will continue to unfold as the escalation of cases continues. But there is hope with the Italy trajectory. Yesterday, there was a drop in cases, that we hope indicates the end of the second peak that is typical in a highly infectious event. There may even be a third peak, but predictably lower.
Saturday, March 14, 2020
"Self-isolation" vs. "self-quarantine". What's the difference?
I have been asked these questions, including the question in the title of this post. I thought it would be useful to share the answers, here.
How
do “self-isolation” and “self-quarantine” differ?
The
short answer is “quarantine” is for anyone who does not show symptoms but may
have been exposed to a contagious diseases; whereas, “isolation” is for anyone
already infected or likely to be infected due to an exposure. Both are done to
prevent transmission of the disease to others.
The
recommended definitions for “isolation” and “quarantine” in the Model Public
Health Act (that is not law unless it is adopted by a state legislature or a
form of it) may have been adopted by any state in their public health laws.
Keep in mind, every state has their own public health law, these are just recommended
standard definitions, not law.
(30)
“Isolate,” “Isolated,” or “Isolation” means the physical separation and
confinement of an individual or groups of individuals who are infected or
reasonably believed to be infected with a contagious or possibly contagious
disease from non-isolated individuals, to prevent or limit the transmission of
the disease to non-isolated individuals.
(53)
“Quarantine” means the physical separation and confinement of an individual or
groups of individuals, who are or may have been exposed to a contagious or
possibly contagious disease and who do not show signs or symptoms of a
contagious disease, from non-quarantined individuals, to prevent or limit the
transmission of the disease to non-quarantined individuals.
The
World Health Organization also similarly defines these terms in the
International Health Regulations (IHR), but includes articles and animals as
well as humans, unlike the Model Act definitions:
“quarantine”
means the restriction of activities and/or separation from others of suspect
persons who are not ill or of suspect baggage, containers, conveyances or goods
in such a manner as to prevent the
possible spread of infection or contamination;
“isolation”
means separation of ill or contaminated persons or affected baggage, containers,
conveyances, goods or postal parcels from others in such a manner as to prevent
the spread of infection or contamination;
· What
do we know about the risk of people going out once they are told to
self-isolate? How likely are they to spread it?
Our
system of quarantine/isolation has always been based on the concept of the
“social compact” that means the government gives you the maximum amount of
freedom to protect public health in exchange for your agreement to
restrict/burden your own freedom to the degree required to do that. So ethical
people agree to this “social compact”. The problem occurs when people do not
keep that agreement, that happens more often than you would think. For example.
Tuberculosis patients agree to come in everyday for antibiotic treatment in
exchange for going about their day with complete freedom of movement. However,
TB patients often do not show up for their antibiotics especially if they are
drug addicts, so eventually, the court will agree to an order after giving them
significant due process to comply with the “social compact”. The consequences
of someone with COVID-19 violating their ”social compact” has high
consequences. This may indicate a higher likelihood of court ordered isolations
or quarantines because when balanced against the harm, the burden on the
individual will be reasonable to prevent that harm. But our constitutional due
process requires that we give a reliable patient the maximum freedom to
self-isolate in their home with only the minimum amount of confinement
necessary to protect the public health.
The
infection rate is about the same as flu and SARS although with different
consequences.
· Do
public health officials have any way of keeping up with all of the people who
have been asked to self-isolate or quarantine? Is a court order, required?
Canada
did a remarkable job of self-isolation and self-quarantine of people with symptoms or exposure to
SARS in 2003-4, when they identified these travelers and sent them home and asked
them to call in each day with a reading of their temperature. They communicated
via telephone or Skype. This is human resource intensive, but they allowed
people to enter their temperature online each day, reducing the human resource
burden near the end of the cycle of SARS. We should be able to do that. If
someone missed calling in, a human followed up with a phone call or a visit.
The U.S. is asking its citizens to honor the social compact and use social distancing even if it is inconvenient, both for the safety of the individual and the safety of others. The U.S. or its states may even ask for self-isolation or self-quarantine of particular individuals, again asking them to honor the social compact. We can do it.
Friday, March 13, 2020
What is a pandemic vs. an epidemic?
The World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11, finally issued the official decree -- COVID-19 is now a "pandemic".
The WHO has criteria for phases of pandemic influenza and they have applied that criteria to Bird Flu and even SARS. There are three criteria that must be met, which you can see from the WHO graphic. First, that the disease is contagious to humans or animals; second, there must be a sustained human to human transmission; and third, it must have "widespread human infection". Even after 34 countries were reporting cases of human to human transmission of COVID-19, WHO had not yet determined this met the "widespread human infection" criteria and many were wondering what it took to meet that criteria, if not 34 countries?
Let's hope for the post peak announcement this spring.
The WHO has criteria for phases of pandemic influenza and they have applied that criteria to Bird Flu and even SARS. There are three criteria that must be met, which you can see from the WHO graphic. First, that the disease is contagious to humans or animals; second, there must be a sustained human to human transmission; and third, it must have "widespread human infection". Even after 34 countries were reporting cases of human to human transmission of COVID-19, WHO had not yet determined this met the "widespread human infection" criteria and many were wondering what it took to meet that criteria, if not 34 countries?
It took 114 countries.
The WHO Director-General in his remarks, said that "In the past two weeks, the number of cases of COVID-19 outside China has increased 13-fold, and the number of affected countries has tripled." Further, " we are deeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and severity, and by the alarming levels of inaction."
This graphic shows the decision-framework WHO uses to assess where we are in the phases before and after a pandemic. The announcement on March 11 is the Phase 5-6/ Pandemic phase. Look for WHO to next consider "post peak" status, hopefully in the near future. Since China and the Republic of Korea have 90% of the cases and have now shown declines in new cases, that's a good sign for the rest of the world. The move toward "post peak" for these two major nation contributors to the number infected indicates other countries should follow that drop in reported cases in the coming weeks depending on the controls and government interventions.
Let's hope for the post peak announcement this spring.
Thursday, March 12, 2020
Contact tracing for airlines -- no more excuses
In 2005, after the SARS global incident, and in preparation for a Bird Flu, the HHS proposed a rule requiring airlines to collect contact information for each passenger in the event they needed to be contacted because of exposure to another passenger, that might be discovered after the flight had ended. The airlines objected loudly to this new administrative burden, citing additional costs and even space on their servers would be exceeded by collecting this information. They objected because of stricter privacy laws in Germany, and our reservation system is Amadeus, a German application used by most airlines. Because the information is stored in Germany, the privacy violation happens within the jurisdiction of Germany even though it is transmitted electronically, it is still in the jurisdiction of Germany requiring compliance with German law.
Graphic of patient zero on a flight and the passengers who were infected with SARS.
So what does this mean? The rule explanation further clarifies who can be "apprehended": apprehension of an individual is based
on a variety of criteria in addition to an
illness report including: Clinical
manifestations, contact or suspected
contact with infected individuals, host
susceptibility, travel to affected
countries or places, or other evidence of
exposure to or infection with a
quarantinable communicable disease.
Since the Paperwork Reduction Act is triggered by the collection of information, and MERS and Ebola were cited as a need for the regulation, there is a directive on the time for collecting this information: While HHS/CDC currently has
approval to collect certain information
concerning illnesses and travelers under
OMB Control Numbers 0920–0134
(Foreign Quarantine Regulations,
expiration date 05/31/2019) and 0920–
0488 (Restrictions on Interstate Travel of
Persons, expiration date 05/31/2019).
Now, back to the current interim regulation, the collection of information is an enforceable rule when final, but it requires an order from the Director of CDC to begin collection of personal information: By this interim final rule, CDC requires airlines to collect and submit via electronic means to CDC, beginning within 24 hours of an order from the Director, certain data regarding passengers and crew arriving on flights arriving in the United States from foreign countries. CDC believes that this is the only mechanism by which it can efficiently obtain the information it needs for a public health response to outbreaks of communicable disease and that current regulatory requirements are not sufficient, especially in public health emergencies. CDC will exercise enforcement discretion where appropriate.
So, on Feb 18 2020, the CDC ordered the airlines to begin collecting personal contact information for passengers and crew traveling from China (or having been in China within the last 14 days), citing the proposed rule published Feb 27.
How is contact tracing for airlines working in the U.S. for domestic flights? Here's my personal story. Yesterday, March 11, 2020, while on a flight, I spoke with a passenger who had been on a flight with a passenger who tested positive for COVID-19. I asked him how he found out --- was contacted by the airline. I had hoped the answer was that he had been promptly contacted by the airline but it was not his answer. He said he heard it on the news.
No more excuses, it is time for airlines to accept their responsibility. CDC has the authority to order the airlines to collect this information. The economic impact analysis states there was found to be no additional cost to the airlines for implementing this rule.
Update, 3-16-2020: The ICAO, an independent association of international airlines develop common guidance for airlines. Here is their directive on contact tracing: "Airport preparedness guidelines for outbreaks of communicable disease" issued by ACI and ICAO (Revised April 2009):
Note.: To assist contact tracing, a passenger locator card is available on the WHO website (www.who.int/csr/ihr/locator_card) and a copy is provided in the Attachment to these guidelines. The International Air Transport Association, assisted by relevant experts, is evaluating different electronic methods that could facilitate traveller tracing.
Update, 3-16-2020: The ICAO, an independent association of international airlines develop common guidance for airlines. Here is their directive on contact tracing: "Airport preparedness guidelines for outbreaks of communicable disease" issued by ACI and ICAO (Revised April 2009):
Note.: To assist contact tracing, a passenger locator card is available on the WHO website (www.who.int/csr/ihr/locator_card) and a copy is provided in the Attachment to these guidelines. The International Air Transport Association, assisted by relevant experts, is evaluating different electronic methods that could facilitate traveller tracing.
Wednesday, March 11, 2020
How many states have declared a state of emergency?
As of March 14, all states except Oklahoma and Maine had issued declarations of a state emergency.
As of March 13, 34 states have now issued declarations of a state of emergency.
As states announce confirmed cases of COVID-19 we can expect to see more states with emergency declarations. Almost half of all states (24) have declared a state of emergency due to COVID-19 by March 11, 2020.
As of March 13, 34 states have now issued declarations of a state of emergency.
As states announce confirmed cases of COVID-19 we can expect to see more states with emergency declarations. Almost half of all states (24) have declared a state of emergency due to COVID-19 by March 11, 2020.
By March 9, 8 states had declared a state of emergency for their state:
1. Saturday, Feb. 29, 2020, Washington Governor Jay Inslee was one of the first U.S. governors to declare a state of emergency,
2. Wednesday, March 4, California Governor Gavin Newsom to declare a state of emergency
3. Sunday, March 1, Florida Governor Ron deSantis declared a public health emergency
4. Thursday, March 5, Maryland Governor Larry Hogan declared a state of emergency
5. Friday, March 6, Utah Governor Gary Herbert announced a state of emergency
6. Friday, March 6, Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear declared a state of emergency
7. Saturday, March 7, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis declared a level 2 state of emergency (which followed a public health emergency declaration on March 1.)
8. Sunday, March 8, Oregon Governor Kate Brown declared a state of emergency
According to By March 11, 24 states had declared a state of emergency for their state:
Wednesday, March 11, Washington, D.C., Mayor Muriel Bowser declared a state of emergency.
Check the interactive map of states with emergency declarations on the National Governor's Association page for COVID-19.
Amerithrax changed our way of communicating with mail; will COVID-19 change our way of meeting?
Amerithrax changed our way of communicating with government officials and with each other. Mail sent through the U.S. Post Office could not longer go directly to Congress, but had to be sent to a testing facility in Ohio before eventually being received by the recipient often weeks later, and looking a bit "fried." We learned to conduct government business online through email, and through interactive forms on websites.
Announcements of cancellations of mass gatherings like the NBA, and universities, has pushed us to use online platforms for communication. We have always had them, but now they are our ways of communicating while avoiding the risk of contracting a pandemic disease. Will we become comfortable with them and find they increase our efficiency, like email did? Will we begin to replace in person meetings at a much greater rate after the COVID-19 pandemic subsides, leaving our lives changed forever, like Amerithrax?
Only time will tell, but if history is a lesson, our in person human contact may be changed forever.
Announcements of cancellations of mass gatherings like the NBA, and universities, has pushed us to use online platforms for communication. We have always had them, but now they are our ways of communicating while avoiding the risk of contracting a pandemic disease. Will we become comfortable with them and find they increase our efficiency, like email did? Will we begin to replace in person meetings at a much greater rate after the COVID-19 pandemic subsides, leaving our lives changed forever, like Amerithrax?
Only time will tell, but if history is a lesson, our in person human contact may be changed forever.
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